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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2) (k) (1994) . 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Appellant Sonji K. Walker attempted to establish the 
negligence of Appellee Parish Chemical Company through use of the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Parish's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial 
challenged the sufficiency of Walker's proof on the foundational 
elements of the doctrine. Consequently, the only issue presented 
for review is whether the trial court correctly concluded the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite foundation for 
res ipsa loquitur. 
This Court reviews the ruling using the same standard applied 
by the trial court. The motion was property granted "if, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, " the Court finds any one of the res ipsa foundational 
elements is not supported by competent evidence. King v. Fereday, 
739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Walker brought this action on August 18, 1992, alleging 
personal injuries suffered as a result of a fire on the premises of 
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Parish Chemical Company in Orem, Utah. (R. 1-5) Although Walker's 
complaint alleges several different theories of recovery, 
ultimately she pursued only a negligence claim based on the res 
ipsa doctrine. (R. 1016) 
The matter was first tried to a jury beginning on November 29, 
1993. (R. 180) On December 1, 1993, the jury learned Parish's 
counsel was in the midst of a family emergency. Walker moved for 
a mistrial, and the motion was granted over Parish's objection. 
(R. 177) 
The second jury trial began on December 19, 1994. (R. 284) 
Parish's motion to dismiss at the end of Walker's case was denied. 
(R. 282-83) The trial court also denied Parish's motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of all evidence. (R.281) The jury 
returned a Special Verdict on December 21, 1994, finding Parish 
negligent and awarding Walker special and general damages totalling 
$21,700.00. (R. 285) The trial court entered its Judgment on 
Special Verdict on January 12, 1995. (R. 307) 
Parish filed a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial. (R. 314) After 
extensive briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on April 28, 1995, granting Parish's motion and 
denying the alternative motion for new trial. (R. 425) On May 18, 
1995, the court entered its Order based on the Memorandum Decision 
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and its Judgment setting aside the Special Verdict and dismissing 
Walker's claims. (R. 432 and 437) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The evidence in the case is most significant for what it does 
not show. For example, no one knows how the Parish fire started. 
(R. 806, 858, 914 & 946) The fire occurred on a holiday. Although 
a few Parish employees were working in the building earlier in the 
day, at the time of the fire no Parish employee was present. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 18) 
The only witness to testify in an arguably expert capacity was 
Russell Ted Peacock, the Director of Public Safety for the City of 
Orem. Mr. Peacock assigned two of his people to investigate the 
fire. (R. 802) Despite their efforts, and those of a federal 
investigative agency, the cause of the fire was never determined. 
(R. 803) Mr. Peacock testified building fires have many causes and 
the official determination of cause is often "unknown origin." (R. 
803-04) The exact cause of this fire remains, officially and 
unofficially, unknown. 
Mark Karamesines, the Parish plant manager, and Dr. Walter 
Wesley Parish, the company president, both speculated concerning 
possible causes of the fire. Mr. Karamesines listed the electric 
ceiling lights, the electrical outlets, lightning and arson as 
"potential sources of ignition." (R. 838 and 846) Dr. Parish 
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identified a few possibilities, including arson and a ballast 
malfunction in one of the fluorescent lights. (R. 934 & 1038) No 
evidence was presented, however, as to the actual cause of the 
fire, and none of the possibilities listed by Mr. Karamesines or 
Dr. Parish included negligence on the part of Parish. 
Walker claims Dr. Parish admitted the fire started from one of 
two causes, either improper chemical storage or arson. The claim 
is based on a misreading of the trial testimony: 
Q. Now Sir, again to switch ground on you. If the fire 
started in Stockroom "A" you would concede, would you 
not, that it started either through improper storage or 
the handling of the materials in that room or by the 
intentional act of someone? 
A. I would not. 
Q. Please turn to your deposition . . . . To sum it up 
then, I understand that as far as the chemicals being a 
hazard, a fire hazard in particular, they would only be 
a hazard or a fire would only start in Storage Room "A" 
as a result of two things then. Either someone 
improperly stored them, leaks or spills or didn't clean 
up a spill or whatever, otherwise there may have been 
negligence or there was arson, but by putting the bottles 
next to each other, to use your word, "doesn't constitute 
a fire hazard." So the fire would either have had to 
start in one of those two ways. Either someone went into 
that room and started the fire intentionally or there was 
an improper storage which you have of course expressly 
denied, is that fair, and you responded? 
A. That is pretty fair. The room was inspected on a fairly 
regular basis. I mean there was someone in that room 
every day. 
(R. 933-34) . This testimony shows only (1) that Dr. Parish 
expressly denies improper storage as a cause of the fire, and (2) 
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that Dr. Parish believes arson is a possible cause. In response to 
the first question, Dr. Parish refused to concede improper storage. 
Counsel for Walker then read a different question from Dr. Parish's 
deposition: "Either someone went into that room and started the 
fire intentionally or there was an improper storage which you have 
of course expressly denied . . . ." Id. (emphasis added) By his 
answer Dr. Parish simply meant arson is possible and "it is fair to 
say I expressly deny improper storage." 
Walker resorts to misleading references in an attempt to 
bolster her position. She states Mr. Karamesines "admitted that 
there are substances which when mixed could constitute a fire 
hazard." Brief of Appellant at 6. What Walker fails to point out 
is that the statement had nothing to do with "substances" in 
stockroom "A", the room in which the fire apparently started. 
Regarding the chemicals in stockroom "A", Mr. Karamesines 
testified: 
Q. If the chemicals came in contact in the room the 
potential source of ignition was the chemicals themselves 
is that fair? 
A. Well, actually are you aware of a combination of 
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am 
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are 




Walker continues to misinterpret the testimony when she 
states: "Mr. Karamesines testified that when oxidizers and 
flammables come together they can start fires." Brief of Appellant 
at 6. The testimony was different in an important way: 
Q. And oxidants can accelerate or be involved in the cause 
of fires can it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As particularly when combined with flammables correct? 
A. Can yes. 
(R. 823) Although Mr. Karamesines agreed these chemicals can "be 
involved in the cause of fires," he did not state "they can start 
fires." The difference is significant because what started the 
Parish fire is the real issue. Many everyday items are flammable, 
but they do not burn without a source of ignition, they do not 
"start fires." 
Walker claims: "Mr. Karamesines could not rule out that 
chemicals in the room could be a source of ignition in and of 
themselves." Brief of Appellant at 6. Actually, what Mr. 
Karamesines could not rule out was the possibility of a potential 
event: 
Q. If the chemicals came in contact in the room the 
potential source of ignition was the chemicals 
themselves. Is that fair? 
A. Well, actually are you aware of a combination of 
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am 
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are 
compounds there that if mixed would be a potential source 
of ignition. 
Q. . . . I want to know if you, as the plant manager, can 
rule that out given the contents of that room? 
A. I wouldn't rule that out, no. 
(R. 842-43) Mr. Karamesines could not rule out the possibility of 
a particular unidentified combination of chemicals coming together 
in some unspecified way to be a potential source of ignition. But 
no one offered evidence suggesting the potential event actually 
occurred, or even probably occurred. 
Walker also elicited speculation from Mr. Karamesines 
regarding matters at least one step removed from an actual fire. 
For example, Walker points out Mr. Karamesines1 testimony that 
"flammable fumes" were a possibility in the room if certain 
containers ruptured or broke. Brief of Appellant at 6. Without a 
source of ignition, however, the flammability of the chemicals or 
the ceiling tile or the light fixtures or anything else in the room 
is irrelevant. 
The paper on which this brief is printed is flammable. If it 
were to burn in an unexplained fire, there could be no reasonable 
suggestion that the person last in possession of the brief was 
negligent. How the fire started is the issue, and Mr. Karamesines' 
testimony provided nothing more than a choice of possibilities, 
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none of which was established as likely or even more likely than 
another possibility. 
Likewise, Walker elicited nothing from Dr. Parish other than 
unsupported possibilities. Walker notes Dr. Parish "admitted that 
the two particular types of chemicals which would be more likely 
than others to start a fire when mixed together would be oxidizers 
and reducing agents." Brief of Appellant at 8. Again, however, 
neither Dr. Parish nor anyone else placed these chemicals in 
stockroom "A" . Moreover, there was no evidence suggesting these or 
any other chemicals had been "mixed together" in the room. Indeed, 
Mr. Karamesines inspected the room for possible hazards roughly an 
hour before the fire and found everything in place, nothing was 
spilled and no chemicals were mixed together. (R. 812-13, 853-54) 
Walker claims Dr. Parish agreed "[t]he only sources for the 
fire . . . were the chemicals themselves and their potentially 
reactive capabilities." Brief of Appellant at 9. But Walker 
overlooks the remainder of the quote. The testimony came from Dr. 
Parish's deposition: 
Q. Question on Line 22, okay, so the only sources for the 
fire sir in that building, were the chemicals themselves 
and their potentially reactive capabilities. That is the 
only source of ignition if you exclude some third person 
that came in the building, isn't that fair and you 
responded on Line 2, Page 256? 
A. I guess that it fair. 
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(R. 93 6) None of the witnesses excluded "some third person that 
came in the building" as a cause of the fire.1 Furthermore, Dr. 
Parish and Mr. Karamesines both testified about other possible 
sources, including the lights and the electrical outlets. 
Walker?s distortion of the evidence continues when she refers 
to " [a] statement Dr. Parish had given as a part of the fire 
investigation . . . . " Brief of Appellant at 9. Walker 
incorrectly characterizes the written "statement" as Dr. Parish's 
testimony and opinion. The statement was actually created by Larry 
Ballard, the Orem City Fire Marshall. (R. 872) Mr. Ballard did 
not testify. Dr. Parish admitted he talked with Mr. Ballard and 
that what Mr. Ballard wrote "is essentially what we talked about, 
but these are Mr. Ballard's words . . . I did not speak these 
words." (R. 93 2) 
At the time of the Ballard interview, Dr. Parish had not yet 
been in the building since the fire started. (R. 961) Mr. Ballard 
asked him to speculate about a possible explosion in a "reaction 
vessel." (R. 93 0 and 962) Dr. Parish gave the speculation Mr. 
Ballard later reported, but Dr. Parish "did not believe it at the 
time of the interview." (R. 963) Mr. Karamesines was asked to 
*Walker notes "[t]here was no evidence presented at trial that 
someone had intentionally started the fire." Brief of Appellant at 
5. It is also true no evidence was offered showing improper 
storage or any other condition attributable to Parish which could 
have started the fire. 
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comment on the speculation and testified: "There was a cause for 
the fire and it definitely was not this 30 gallon reaction vessel 
which I know to have been completely intact after the fire." (R. 
873) 
Finally, Walker refers to Dr. Parish's testimony regarding a 
fluorescent light ballast Dr. Parish once saw catching fire, and 
states: "Dr. Parish did not explain why, while Parish Chemical 
thought the ballast has a propensity for explosions, the company 
did not remove the ballast from a room where flammable materials 
were stored." Brief of Appellant at 9. Dr. Parish never testified 
that the ballasts had a "propensity for explosions." He stated the 
opposite: 
Q. You believe that an explosion in the ballast in Stockroom 
"A" is one of the possible causes of this fire? 
A. Well, it is not really an explosion. The ballast simply 
catches on fire and burns, and hot burning tar drips out 
of the ballast. If that happens it can cause a problem. 
I have only seen it happen once. I have heard of it 
happening. It is a rather infrequent occurrence. It is 
not something you expect but it is a possibility. 
(R. 1038) 
In addition to using inaccurate and incomplete references, 
Walker distorts the factual picture of this case by failing to 
separate the evidence of circumstances from the testimony on 
possibilities. The two are mixed together in Walker's statement of 
facts, but of course only the factual evidence is meaningful. The 
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testimony on possibilities is pure speculation and conjecture since 
no one established any possibility as likely. 
Walker used no expert to testify as to the cause of the fire. 
Messrs. Parish and Karamesines are chemists, not fire 
investigators. No expert was produced to opine that this fire was 
the result of negligent actions on the part of Parish or that fires 
of this kind can only occur when negligence occurs. As the trial 
court correctly concluded, the jury was not entitled to rely on the 
speculation and without it, the circumstantial evidence did not 
provide the requisite res ipsa foundation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the trial court denied Parish's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict, it was "deemed to have submitted the action to the jury 
subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by 
the motion." Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) . The legal question raised by 
the directed verdict motion, and the later Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, was whether the evidence met the 
foundational requirements for application of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine. The answer reached by the trial court is the same 
reached in almost every other res ipsa case involving a fire of 
unknown origin. Our common knowledge and experience tell us that 
fires occur frequently without negligence. When Walker failed to 
offer evidence to refute our common knowledge and experience, when 
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she failed to establish that the fire was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had Parish used 
due care, she failed to prove the first res ipsa element. 
Likewise, Walker failed to prove the second res ipsa element. 
She offered no evidence to "trace the cause of the fire to an 
instrument for which the defendant was responsible . . . . " 
Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Company, 374 P. 2d 311, 312 (Utah 
1962) . Walker offered several theories, and elicited testimony on 
several possibilities, but none of the theories or possibilities 
was supported by evidence. 
The jury was left to arrive at its conclusion by speculation, 
conjecture or a choice of possibilities based on speculation and 
conjecture. The law requires more. Since Walker failed to provide 
more, the res ipsa doctrine does not apply and the trial court 
correctly granted Parish's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
Lacking proof of specific negligence, Walker's case was 
necessarily predicated on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Res 
ipsa is an evidentiary rule which allows an inference of negligence 
to be drawn if a plaintiff first establishes the requisite factual 
foundation by proving three elements: 
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(1) the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary 
course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant used due care; 
(2) the agency or instrumentality causing the accident 
was at the time of the accident under the exclusive 
management or control of the defendant; and 
(3) the plaintiff's own use or operation of the agency 
or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the 
accident. 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P. 2d 858, 861 (Utah 
1992) . 
The res ipsa doctrine lightens a plaintiff's burden of proof 
in the appropriate case. That is, where a plaintiff can prove the 
foundational elements, the doctrine forgives the obligation to show 
a specific act of negligence. Thus, if Walker could have proved 
the Parish fire started when two incompatible chemicals came into 
contact, she would have satisfied the second res ipsa element --
she would have traced "the cause of the fire to an instrument for 
which the defendant was responsible . . . . " Bamhill v. Young 
Electric Sign Co., 374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962). Assuming she 
proved the rest of the factual foundation, the jury would have had 
a proper basis from which to infer the two chemicals came into 
contact as a result of Parish's negligence. 
But the law of res ipsa does not allow proof of the 
foundational facts by inference. Contrary to Walker's assertion, 
the jury could not properly infer the fire started when two 
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chemicals came into contact. To rely on res ipsa Walker was 
required to offer facts showing how the fire started. Res ipsa 
loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." As noted in Emigh v. 
Andrews, 191 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948): 
[this] means the thing or instrumentality involved speaks 
for itself. It clearly does not mean the accident speaks 
for itself. It means that when the initial fact, namely 
what thing or instrumentality caused the accident has 
been shown then, and not before, an inference arises that 
the injury or damage occurred by reason of the negligence 
of the party who had it under his exclusive control. 
Id. at 903 (emphasis in original). 
Whether a case should go to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur 
theory is a question of law. Raines v. Sony Corp. of America, 523 
N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. App. 1994) . The issue is whether the 
plaintiff established the requisite evidentiary foundation. King, 
832 P.2d at 861. In this case, Walker was not entitled to a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction because she failed to establish the first 
two elements. She failed to show that "the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened 
had due care been observed . . . . " Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P. 2d 
719, 722 (Utah 1985) , and she could not "trace the cause of the 
fire to an instrument for which . . . [Parish] was responsible." 
Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co., 374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962) . 
Consequently, the trial court correctly granted Parish's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
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POINT I: FIRES OCCUR FREQUENTLY WITHOUT ANYONE'S FAULT. 
Walker's case never got past the first res ipsa element. 
Walker could not show "the accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant used due care . . . ." King, 832 P.2d at 861. 
This element can be established in one of two ways. Walker 
could have referred to "the common knowledge and experience of the 
community with respect to how such events generally occur." Id. at 
862. If, however, "the probabilities of a situation are outside 
the realm of common knowledge," expert testimony is necessary to 
prove the element. Ballow, 699 P. 2d at 722; King, 832 P. 2d at 862. 
The only arguably expert testimony on fires came from Russell 
Ted Peacock, the Director of Public Safety for the City of Orem. 
Although Mr. Peacock's prior employment and experience involved 
only police work, he had a supervisory role over the fire 
department during his thirteen years as Director of Public Safety. 
Mr. Peacock gave no testimony from which one might conclude 
the Parish fire "was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had due care been observed . . . ." 
Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722. 
The only other evidence concerning how fires generally occur 
came from a non-expert, Mark Karamesines, the Parish plant manager, 
who testified: 
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As a person with some mechanical experience I recognize 
that it is possible for a fire to be started by a great 
many different causes. I think that electrical wiring or 
lights, etc., are known pretty much to anyone as a 
potential fire hazard. 
(R. 841) Mr. Karamesines and Dr. Parish (another non-expert) both 
speculated concerning possible causes of the Parish fire. But no 
other evidence was offered concerning how fires generally occur. 
Walker failed to prove the first res ipsa element when she could 
not show the fire "was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had due care been observed . . . ." 
Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722. 
Walker's inability to prove the first res ipsa element was not 
surprising since common knowledge and experience tell us fires 
frequently occur without negligence. As Professors Prosser and 
Keeton point out: 
[T]here are many accidents which, as a matter of common 
knowledge, occur frequently enough without anyone's 
fault. A tumble downstairs, a fall in alighting from a 
standing bus or street car, . . . a fire of unknown 
origin, will not in themselves justify the conclusion 
that negligence is the most likely explanation; and to 
such events res ipsa loquitur does not apply. 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts §3 9 at 246 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes 
omitted, emphasis added). 
The conclusion reached by Professors Prosser and Keeton is 
supported by almost every res ipsa case involving a fire of unknown 
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origin. In Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 111 P.2d 1033 
(Idaho 1986), the Idaho Supreme Court observed: 
Our common knowledge and experience, or that of a jury, 
would not justify the inference that the accident would 
not have happened in the absence of negligence in that 
there are many possible causes for a building fire in the 
absence of negligence. 
Id. at 1037. In Appalachian Insurance Co. v. G.B. Knutson, 242 
F.Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1965), the Court noted that "Kansas law, in 
full accord with the law of every other jurisdiction that has 
passed on the specific question, proceeds on the postulate that the 
experience of mankind is that fires may and do in fact have 
multiple causes, some of which involve negligence and some of which 
do not . . . ." Id. at 237-38.2 
Parish1 s survey of Utah law found four cases in which the res 
ipsa doctrine is invoked in an attempt to establish liability for 
a fire. Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co., 3 74 P.2d 311 (Utah 
2See Royal Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 
15 (E.D. N.Y. 1992), aff'd 992 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1992) (concluding 
res ipsa inapplicable when no proof that the fire would probably 
not have occurred in the absence of negligence) ; Milwaukee Land Co. 
v. Basin Produce Corp., 396 F.Supp. 528 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (holding 
res ipsa not applicable because fires occur in the absence of 
negligence); Foerster v. Fischbach-Moore, Inc., 178 N.W.2d 258 
(N.D. 1970) (agreeing res ipsa should not be submitted to jury 
because fires frequently occur without negligence); In Re Estate of 
Morse, 391 P.2d 117 (Kan. 1964) (noting courts reluctant to apply 
res ipsa to fire cases because fires frequently occur without 
negligence on the part of anyone) ; Gutknecht v. Wagner Bros. Moving 
& Storage Co., 266 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App. 1954) (holding res ipsa 
inapplicable because fires commonly occur where care has been 
exercised as well as where care has been wanting). 
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1962) focuses on the second res ipsa element in concluding the 
"trial court properly refused to allow the jury to speculate" on 
the cause of a building fire. Id. at 314. Wightman v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 302 P.2d 471 (Utah 1956), also focused on the 
second element in noting proof of how a natural gas explosion 
occurred "cannot rest upon speculation or conjecture, nor upon a 
mere choice of possibilities." Id. at 473. Logan v. Peterson, 604 
P. 2d 488 (Utah 1979) , involved a house fire of unknown origin. The 
trial court focused on the third res ipsa element in concluding the 
doctrine does not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed on other 
grounds. 
In Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court's review turned on the first res ipsa element. Ballow 
claimed Monroe was responsible for a fire which spread from 
Monroe's land onto Ballow1s, burning 100 acres of Ballow's wheat. 
No one could say how the fire started. The trial court refused to 
submit the case to the jury on a res ipsa theory, and the jury 
returned a verdict for Monroe. 
Focusing on the first element, the Supreme Court affirmed, 
pointing out: 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application 
unless it can be shown from past experience that the 
occurrence causing the disability is more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause . . . . 
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Id. at 722 (quoting Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves1 Latter-Day Saints 
Hospital, 440 P.2d 872, 873-4 (Utah 1968)). The "past experience" 
referred to by the court is the past experience of the community or 
of an expert: 
Since the res ipsa loquitur instruction permits the jury 
to infer negligence from the happening of the accident 
alone, there must be a basis either in common knowledge 
or expert testimony that when such an accident occurs, it 
is more probably than not the result of negligence. 
Id. In Ballow, the court concluded the evidence "cast no light" on 
whether a fire ordinarily would not happen but for someone's 
negligence. Id. at 723. 
Likewise, in this case Walker failed to establish that fires 
of unknown origin ordinarily only happen when someone is at fault. 
On the contrary, the only arguably expert testimony established 
that fires occur from many causes and that this particular fire 
could have resulted from a number of causes, only one of which is 
negligence. Walker offered no insight into the "common knowledge," 
but as the court noted in Appalachian Insurance, the law in 
"every . . . jurisdiction that has passed on the specific question 
proceeds on the postulate that the experience of mankind is that 
fires may and do in fact have multiple causes, some of which 
involve negligence and some of which do not . . . ." Appalachian 
Insurance, 242 F.Supp. at 237-38 (emphasis added). 
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Walker tries to avoid characterizing the Parish fire as a fire 
of unknown origin. She knows this is the only characterization 
supported by the facts, but she also knows res ipsa is almost never 
applied in unknown origin fire cases. Consequently, she tries to 
undermine the characterization of the fire by attacking the way in 
which the trial court arrived at the characterization. She argues 
the trial court improperly looked at fires "generally" rather than 
looking at the particular facts of this case. 
Walker's criticism is unjustified. The record contains 
nothing to suggest the trial court ignored the facts of this case. 
Walker points to Olswanger v. Funk, 470 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1970), as a demonstration of the correct way to analyze the first 
res ipsa element. Reliance on Olswanger is curious since the case 
actually highlights the weaknesses in Walker's position. The 
evidence in Olswanger allowed a precise characterization of the 
fire. Plaintiff proved the fire originated in a couch in the 
apartment rented by defendants. Consequently, this was a "couch 
fire" case. The Tennessee Court of Appeals was correct when it 
said "a fire does not ordinarily originate in a couch in an 
apartment in the absence of negligence . . . ." Id. 
Unlike Olswanger, the origin of the fire in this case could 
not be identified. Although Walker argues the chemicals somehow 
started the fire, unlike the plaintiff in Olswanger, Walker offered 
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no evidence on the point. She introduced the possibility that the 
chemi' -.1? •=" "^ ; ' A ,-•-,--• •-- - -:acn _ r — other possibilities 
noted by tne witnesses vvere -.t least as .^ix.ei\ . . x best, the 
evidence shows the fire started in stockroom "A" . Our common 
hiow]f. ]l --" ' 1 "vrav'-"n-^ "- ' ~s start from a 
number of causes, and Walker orterec >-•« evidence to refute that 
common knowledge and experience i n this case. 
Walker ai g i les the tr i al :> : i 1:1 : t app] i e :i a • : • : i: i d i ;i s:i < • e pre si impti on 
against use of tiie res ipsa doctrine - n : i_c ^ases. Tne argument 
finds no suppor: r he recor, :s true, however, that trie 
ipsa L., establisn liability icr a fire or. unknown crigi. 
occasional aberration appears :: the oase -aw, but these almost 
evidence shewing that the defendant should know hew tne fire 
started, but refuses to testify. 
i1: .-r;>- - t i l z: 
first case cited by Walker i:„ _::is seo^un ui nei brief, is a good 
example of th^ first exception. Defendants conducted an auto 
r-iUcl^ L L..t:h --• 
piaintift Aithougn tne exact caude c: ;..- fire was unknown, 
plaintiff called an expert who testified the vehicles parked ;n "he 
garage gave off flammable gaso] :i i le , a/;: •  :>i s Tl: le - •.. - i . _ »:^. . . 
2 1 
that "the most probable fuel involved in the fire was gasoline 
vapor." Id. at 572. The expert also testified as to the 
"probable" way in which the gasoline vapors were drawn into a pilot 
light, starting the fire. Under these circumstances, the Horner 
case cannot be properly classified as an unknown origin fire case. 
Expert testimony established the probable origin of the fire. 
The other cases cited by Walker in support of her position on 
the first res ipsa element are also distinguishable. Standard Oil 
Co. of New Jersey v. Midgett, 116 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1941), 
involved both explosion and a fire. The most significant evidence 
showed that the explosion occurred before the fire. The trial 
court focused on this evidence, charging the jury "that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied if, but only if, the 
jury found that the explosion . . . was prior in time to the fire." 
Id. at 564. The court's focus on the timing of the events is 
telling. The implication is that res ipsa applies in explosion 
cases because explosions do not usually happen absent negligence. 
The doctrine should not apply in unknown fire cases because fires 
often happen without negligence. 
Walker also cites Oakdale Building Corp. v. Smithereen Co., 54 
N.E.2d 231 (111. Ct. App. 1944) . Oakdale is an example of the kind 
of fire case in which the res ipsa doctrine is often applied. The 
key point is that the defendant refused to put on any evidence 
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regarding the cause of the fire, so the court decided the defendant 
was concealing knowledge about the fire. The court stated: 
Defendant may have had some knowledge aj ~^ n^ .% the fire 
originated; if not, it was certainly incumbent upon it to 
offer evidence as to the nature of the work done in the 
apartment, the materials used, and what its 
representative did during the half hour that he had 
control of the apartment, to rebut or overcome, if it 
could, the circumstantial presumption of negligence. To 
allow defendant to escape liability by concealing such 
knowledge after plaintiffs had adduced all the evidence 
that they possibly could under the circumstances would be 
perversion of the rule upon which the doctrine is 
founded. 
I'd. az 22- '!? ^ r- evay: suggested Parish is concealing knowledge. 
rta^Ker 'j^  _ _ - .• - —i 
support of che conclusion t;na^  cne cocnrine may apply even though 
the exact cause of the f:r^ - ~ unknown ?"cv/ler is n?r a fire case. 
Tt
~ involve a a :;iree ye~... • r--.
 : - .. 
J3cd health, -\n i w=,^  picked up later wic'. a cram concussion. 
I'rdal--. the r?k-icr.:-'.r decided -h^ defendant knew whac 
happened L^Z wa.j /;i*.:.nc±c:ing z:>: ::.:::.:. .:.. 
[I]t appears that defendant had a guilty conscience and 
tried to cover up the injury. Certainly, it appears that 
defendant knew something had happened to plaintiff while 
plaintiff was under her supervision. 
From this evidence the jury could irner, re_-t^ u:icijjjLy, LIICIL 
the proffered explanation was false. This is important. 
Here we have a defendant, who had supervision of a child 
when the injury occurred, offering a false and certainly 
an unsatisf^ntorv explanation. She was under a duty to 
explain. Where, under the evidence, an 
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explanation is called for, if the defendant refuses to 
explain or gives a false explanation, it is reasonably 
inferable that the defendant is hiding something which, 
more probably than not, is his negligence. 
Id. at 701-02.3 Again, there is no suggestion of concealment in 
the present matter. 
Finally, Walker ends her argument on the first res ipsa 
element with a citation to Roland Associates, Inc. v. Pierce, 476 
S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). The fire originated in a paint 
booth. Defendant was actively working on the cleaning the booth at 
the moment the fire started. The booth was not connected to any 
source of electricity. In other words, there was absolutely 
nothing besides defendant's work which could have started the fire. 
That fact, combined with defendant's refusal to offer evidence, 
persuaded the court to allow the jury to decide the case based on 
res ipsa. 
3
 The dissent in Fowler, concurred in by Justice Traynor, 
discusses the law in terms more consistent with current Utah law: 
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not intended to open 
the door for mere speculation as to the cause of an 
injury. Here a necessary prerequisite for its 
application was a showing of facts sufficient to 
establish that the accident was more probably than not 
the result of defendant's negligence, for "in the absence 
of such a probability there would be no basis for an 
inference of negligence which would serve to take the 
place of evidence of some specific act or omission." 
Id. at 703 (emphasis in original). 
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Professors Prosser and Keaton, the Utah Supreme Court and 
a ] most every other jurisdiction which has an^Ivzed che issu^ V! "; 
conclude res ipsa loquitur has no app-ic = Li.:. _n cases i:./._ _ 
fires of unknown origin. The first element necessary to an 
.;:;.;, loctrine- -that fires normally do not occur 
without negligence - is simply contrary to our common knowledge and 
experience. Walker offered no expert testimony to refute our 
commc i i 1 :nowl pdqp . exp~ A —ri'"7 , sue tailed to 
establish the first res ipsa element. 
POINT II: RES IPSA LOQUITUF iiA.l NO APPLICATION IN THE ABSENCE OF 
EVIDENCE SHOWING WHAT INSTRUMENTALITY CAU.—T THE FIRE. 
The fire at Parish was a fire .:: unknown ziigin. Almost 
unknown origin fire cases a^ .e unsuccessfa.. -- reason ,o 
succinctly stated in Barnhill .. .cung Electric Sign Jo. , 274 ?.2i 
3] ] (I J' ., .1 3 5 • 52) : 
It is clear . . . that the doctrine cannot be invoked to 
show negligence until "the initial fact, namely what 
thing or instrumentality caused the accident has been 
shown . . . . [T] hen and not before, an inference arises 
that the injury or damage occurred by reason of the 
negligence of the party who had . , . [the 
instrumentality] under his exclusive control," 
Barnhi:i, 7^4 P,2d at 312 (quoting Emigh v. Andrews, 131 P.2d 901, 
Barnhill involved ~. building fire of unknown origin. 
Plaintiff contended circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant's 
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faulty installation and maintenance of a large electric sign as the 
cause of the fire. The trial court disagreed, and granted 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court framed the issue in a 
concise, pointed manner. The court could have been discussing this 
case when it asked: 
"Did the plaintiff trace the cause of the fire to an 
instrument for which the defendant was responsible so 
that the cause of the fire was not left to conjecture?" 
Id. at 312. The evidence in Barnhill pointed to many possible 
causes of the fire. On the question of what caused the fire, 
however, pointing out possibilities is not enough. As in this 
case, the Barnhill fire could not "be traced to a specific 
instrumentality or cause for which defendant was 
responsible . . . . " Id. at 313 (quoting Prosser, Torts §42 at 
204-05 (2d ed. 1955) ) . Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded 
"[t]he trial court properly refused to allow the jury to speculate 
on this issue." Id. at 314. 
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Emigh v. Andrews, 191 
P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948), provides a well-reasoned explanation of why 
res ipsa should not be used under these circumstances. Emigh 
involved a fire which burned sixty acres of plaintiff's wheat. 
Exactly how the fire started was unknown. Plaintiff could only say 
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that the fire started at a point over which defendant's truck had 
passec immediately before. 
i -:. i 1111 i 1 i I i Miusbiry plain1: J f t "' '• • I^P, the it'uj] V 
explained the second res ipsa element: 
[The words res ipsa loquitur] simply means "the thing 
speaks for itself." .And that means the thing or 
instrumentality involved speaks for itself. It clearly 
does not mean the accident speaks for itself. It means 
that when the initial fact, namely what thing or 
instrumentality caused the accident has been shown then, 
and not before, an inference arises that the injury or 
damage occurred by reason of the negligence of the party 
who had i t under his exclusive control. 
li. at 903 (emphasis in original) .-"• • in this case,, the plaintiff 
in Emigh could only presume the fire was caused by an 
instrumental-t_, unaej. aeiiiiua:.: - _. _.i^ --
 r
 :
--— - i :)I l ^^s 
insufficient to 1 r; the foundation for res ipsa: 
_. tne mere cresumpticn tf the initial cause of tne fire 
trie further inference is sought to be drawn that the 
truck was defective or improperly operated. Such an 
inference cannot be drawn from a mere presumption. The 
established rule is that liability cannot result from. an. 
inference upon an inference or from a presumption upon a 
presumption . . . . The inference arises only from 
established foundation facts. Manifestly the inference 
cannot supply the foundation facts from which the 
i nference avisos, 
Id. at 904 (citations omitted, emphasis in oi iginal) . 
On the presumption that two chemicals somehow mixed to cause 
• •
 ::
 •" "  ;r]><-- -,:'-••>,:•- i * i r~«/ - • further inference 
chat Parish improperly scored its cnemica-..- i:i .i manner which 
allowed the mixing. This kind of inference upon inference does not 
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support liability. Application of the res ipsa doctrine requires 
a foundation based on facts, not presumptions or inferences.4 
Mr. Peacock was the first witness to testify concerning what 
caused the Parish Chemical fire. Again, he offered nothing on 
direct examination, but on cross examination he made it clear this 
was a fire of unknown origin: 
Q. Did you, as a result of that investigation, make an 
official determination as to the cause of this fire? 
A. No, we did not. 
Q. To your knowledge, was the cause of this fire ever 
officially determined? 
A. No, Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms Federal Agency was 
there also. To my knowledge a determination as to the 
cause of the fire has never been made. 
(R. 802-03) Mr. Peacock had no factual information about the 
fire's cause, and he was not asked to speculate or list 
possibilities. 
4See Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 111 P.2d 1033, 
1036 (Idaho 1986) (concluding " [t]he cause of fire cannot be 
established by application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur . . . ." Since plaintiff could not identify the origin of 
the fire, "the 'instrumentality causing the injury' was not 
established . . . . " ) ; Foerster v. Fischbach-Moore, Inc., 178 
N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1970) (holding case will not be submitted to jury 
under res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff presented no evidence of 
the cause of the fire, and fires frequently occur without 
negligence); In Re Estate of Morse, 391 P.2d 117 (Kan. 1964) 
(noting res ipsa loquitur requires a clear showing of the thing or 
instrumentality which started the fire); Smith v. Vanier, 307 P.2d 
539 (Okla. 1957) (holding plaintiff must prove what caused the fire 
before res ipsa may be invoked). 
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I" _ontrast, Mr. Karamesines and Dr. Parish were both asked to 
specula t:e aboi it the :ause of the fire . Mr. Karamesines testified: 
Q. What were the potential sources of ignition ? 
A There were electric ceiling lights. There were a few 
electrical outlets installed in the walls of the room. 
S3-- (emphasis added - .-- . .i^keo again regarding "potential 
_ . ^.. .z oc;: . • -Th+:n: r T " - m d 
" [sjomebody coulu :.^i~ talked ±.^ i::eie w^Lh ^ ^^Lcn or a ciowtcrch, 
that is possible 6-\h emphasis added) 
; W — .~i -(A; -
Stock Rooni *A" * _. _ ; ''cotenciai source of ignition" for the fire. 
C. 11 che chemicals came _. ronnact in the room the 
potential source of igniticr ; -i.-- the chemicals 
themselves . '-- *-- = - ^- : - ~ 
A. Well, actually are you aware of a combination of 
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am 
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are 
compounds there that if mixed would be a potential source 
c^ icrniti^r 
si I want to know if you, as the plant manager, 
c..._ . *- .- ... a" ~,,~ ciTr^n the contents o42 *-h = *- voom? 
;
 wouldn ' t. i ul-_- : i out, i 10 . 
(R 842-43) In other words, Mr. Karamesines could not rule out the 
possibi li t} r of a 
7 Parish's -estimc/.y proceeded in a similar fashion. Dr. 
Parish does no h know how the fire started. He agreed with the 
f c .. - :V."-:..T J-_ iL'.j" -. .i ;• Walker I|" s c: oi n lsel i 
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Now sir there are a number of things we don't know about 
the fire. Particularly, we don't know the original 
source, well I should use the word "ignition." For 
example spark, whether it is a spark, chemical reaction, 
spontaneous combustion, electrical, overheating or just 
what that source of ignition is, . . . . 
(R. 921) Walker's counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Parish 
regarding the flammability of certain chemicals. For example, Dr. 
Parish testified that Stock Room "A" contained certain chemicals 
which, if mixed together, would be "combustible." (R. 924) Again, 
however the issue is not combustibility, but what started the fire. 
On this point neither Dr. Parish nor any other witness could offer 
facts tracing "the cause of the fire to an instrument for which the 
defendant was responsible." Barnhill, 3 74 P.2d at 312. 
Walker's only argument regarding the second element is that 
Parish controlled stockroom "A". Whether or not true, the argument 
is immaterial since stockroom "A" did not cause the injury. A fire 
which burned the contents of the stockroom caused the injury, and 
Walker offered no evidence regarding the source of the fire. 
Walker tries to avoid the flaw in her argument by ignoring 
applicable law: 
Thus, the control over the chemicals in Stockroom A was 
established. The instrumentality causing the damage in 
this case was the chemicals. The chemicals were the only 
materials that could burn in Stockroom A and whether the 
ignition was by blowtorch, by spark, or by burning light 
ballasts, the instrumentality under the defendant's 
control which caused the problem was the chemicals 
themselves. 
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Brief of Appellant at 34. Logically extended,, the argument asks 
* "-" } >:;• f ire is c:e resrcr.sib: 1 it v of ^'~- r^r^cn who 
^wT:3 or connro^s cue tning our:.L , i __".^ _. _ ...:., -i i i lg 
cigarette into a garbage can, starting a fire which burns down a 
responsible the person who owns the 
garbage can or *..o c^acea t:^ paper :i i i tl i = • : 'an w 1: il ::1: i caugl it: : m: i 
fire, In res ipsa fire cases Utah law requires proof of the source 
- Vrs-r-i rer--"r.. 
Victoria Z-aik Apartments, 1 l ic. IA'C^OC:;, - -. -
(N.E. 1985) provides good analysis on the "instrumentality" 
"for-: : r- "* ' ' --? v n-ti^- landlord 
against tenanc for damage caused Ly a .lie ^  tne apartment. 1'^ 
landlord's theory of r^>- fire was that a cigarette was dropped 
i »eLwe< - ._ ; " :-y-d ind pvnnfually 
ignited r.he couc: lie North Dakota Cojrt rioted: 
Victoria Park relies en Clswanger v. Fu^k . vhich 
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee indicated that the 
defendant's exclusive control of the couch in which the 
fire started was sufficient to satisfy the "exclusive 
control" element of res ipsa loquitur. We question the 
logic of a rule which would permit an inference of 
negligence to arise merely from the defendant's control 
over the object in which the fire originated or the area 
which it originated. The far better rule . . . is that 
"tl :i 2 ' thing' or ' instrumentality' which caused the fire 
is required to be under the control of the defendant." 
Id. at 160 (citations omitted). 
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The court stated that, under Victoria Park's theory, the thing 
or instrumentality which caused the fire was the cigarette, not the 
couch or the apartment: 
Thus, in order for the instruction on res ipsa loquitur 
to be given, it was incumbent upon Victoria Park to 
present evidence from which the jury could determine that 
[the tenant] had exclusive control over the cigarette 
which ignited the fire. At best, Victoria Park's 
evidence created an inference that one of the three 
persons present in the apartment that morning had control 
over the offending cigarette; beyond that, the jury was 
left to speculate as to which of the three was the 
offending party. 
Id. The court concluded that, without evidence of who controlled 
the cigarette, there is no basis for applying the doctrine. 
Victoria Park presented a stronger case for applying the 
doctrine than did Walker. Victoria Park presented evidence to 
support its theory on how the fire started. Walker presented 
nothing but unsupported possibilities. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri provided a particularly thorough analysis of the 
application of res ipsa law to fire cases in Appalachian Insurance 
Co. v. G.B. Knutson, 242 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1965) . The case 
involved a fire of unknown origin which spread from defendants' 
property and burned certain goods stored by plaintiff's insured in 
a nearby warehouse. After determining Kansas law prohibits the 
application of res ipsa in the case, the court went on: 
32 
Courts O'ther than Kansas who follow and apply the same 
common law concepts of res ipsa loquitur have reached 
exactly the same conclusion as Kansas. Such consistency 
of treatment of cases involving unknown fires would tend 
to fortify both the correctness of the Kansas law and our 
determination of the state of that law. 
Our research indicates that ever} case t;iat has squarely 
considered the question of the applicability of res ipsa 
loquitur to fires of unknown origin has reached a result 
consistent with that reached by Kansas. 
Id. a~ 235. 
i -v - - : urisdictions reviewed by the Appalachian 
Insurance Courc weie, A*::..:-- _t _ h-n, decide I . .1 UP ox both of 
the grounds supporting Parish's position in this case. t«"ires occu.t 
trequeuLJ1; "( -•:"'-:-:—^ -- t^ .d vh^n th^ fire is -i unknown 
origin, the case is, almost L,\ u^ii:_
 :?-^: - iy~ ^ -- rroof 
that the instrumentality causing the fire was under the exclusive 
contr.... . i.-.-^-^z^ talker was not entitled to a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction in ir.is case beet ..-.-•-: ra.'.t establish 
thes^ f^rsr rw^ ^ s ipsa elements. The trial court correctly 
deciu_u c- •. - v r;t ^i^^ was completely devoid of 
competent evidence on chese essentia- ;. • . 
CONCLUSION 
1
 : *: r?'^- t itsa is to prevent injustice to an 
unprotected plaintiff. However, it mu^ - :. .. --t ;] :---^  tn 
equally blameless and unprotected defendarr Application ..i tn.e 
doctrine under these circumstances places an inequitable burden 
upon the defendant. 
The trial court correctly concluded the evidence was 
insufficient to establish the requisite foundation for res ipsa 
loquitur. Consequently, the trial court's order and judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Dated this *-T day of October, 1995. 
R. SMlftf 
ERIC P . LEE 
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